Germany’s chancellor-elect has launched a vigorous critique of the Trump administration, just hours after securing victory in Sunday’s federal election.
“After [President] Donald Trump’s comments last week … it is evident that this government shows little concern for the future of Europe,” remarked Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), during a live discussion on election night. He urged for Germany’s “independence” from the United States.
On February 18, Trump referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “modestly successful comedian” who had morphed into “a dictator without elections” and had performed “poorly”.
This marked a stark contrast to the close relationship Zelenskyy had with Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden. Zelenskyy even offered to resign on Sunday if Ukraine could gain immediate NATO membership.
Just a week prior, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shocked European leaders by insisting they “must bear the lion’s share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine” while also leading the defense of their continent against Russia by increasing spending from 2 percent to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
Merz expressed uncertainty about whether NATO would remain in its current form at the next summit in June, stating, “Or whether we will need to establish a European defense capability much sooner.”
In a press conference on Monday, Merz conveyed to reporters that “it is five minutes to midnight for Europe” concerning defense matters.
His assertive comments contrast sharply with the limited mandate given to him by voters.
The CDU’s 28.6 percent of the votes in Sunday’s election marks its lowest margin of victory since the party’s founding in 1949.
Merz believes the US is ‘throwing Ukraine to the wolves’
Merz is in fast-track negotiations to form a centrist “grand coalition” with the ousted Social Democratic Party (SPD).
His CDU, in partnership with the Christian Social Union (CSU), could govern with 360 members in the 630-seat Bundestag, but they need to reconcile their differences regarding foreign policy, defense, and the underlying economic policies.
SPD leader Olaf Scholz has firmly opposed sending 500km-range (310-mile) Taurus missiles to Ukraine. Merz stated last October that he would consider doing so if Russia persisted in its attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Moscow consistently denies targeting civilians in the conflict.
“Merz clearly believes the US is abandoning Ukraine and that supplying arms would bolster its position,” stated Timothy Less, senior adviser for geopolitics at Cambridge University’s Centre for Risk Studies, in an interview with Al Jazeera. “However, this pursuit will be challenging. Public opinion in Germany is divided over military support for Ukraine, and the same goes for the SPD.”
“Once the EU public grasps the overwhelming financial implications of supporting Ukraine’s war efforts and the long-term risks of pushing Russia toward stronger ties with China, North Korea, and Iran, there will be widespread calls for the war to conclude,” warned Demetries Grimes, a former naval commander and US attache to Greece and Israel, in a discussion with Al Jazeera.
Both Merz and Scholz agree on the necessity of enhancing Germany’s manufacturing competitiveness through more affordable energy; however, Merz is advocating for the reactivation of three nuclear power plants that were decommissioned by the Scholz administration.
Additionally, Merz aims to reduce the welfare state, which is central to the SPD’s economic philosophy.
“It is misguided to pay individuals for not working, as it fails to incentivize others to return to the labor market,” he expressed at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos last month.
One of the primary points of contention is Germany’s constitutional limit on budget deficits, set at 0.35 percent of GDP, which contributed to Scholz taking three years to elevate defense spending to 2 percent of GDP. Both leaders have hesitated to endorse an increase to 5 percent.
“Without genuine budgetary strength behind it, Merz’s rhetoric is merely sound,” remarked Grimes.
Scholz now supports a “smart and targeted modification of the debt rule,” arguing that Germany’s low debt, at 62 percent of GDP, provides room for borrowing.
Merz, a staunch advocate for maintaining the deficit ceiling, indicated in November that he might consider adjustments, yet not for the type of welfare expenditures favored by the Social Democrats.
The most significant divergence between them pertains to immigration policies.
“We will immediately halt that segment of migration which arises from family reunification,” Merz stated at the WEF. “There are 500,000 individuals who’ve entered Germany in the past four years without any oversight. This must cease immediately.”
As the opposition leader, Merz invited the SPD to coalesce with him on this proposal on January 29.
When they declined, he startled them by seeking support from any source, even the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). “I can no longer place my trust in him,” Scholz remarked following the vote.
United in adversity
Yet, two factors may be fostering a closer relationship between Merz and Scholz. One is the growing support for the AfD, which garnered 20.8 percent of the vote—double its 2021 performance—largely at the expense of both the CDU and SPD, particularly on migration issues.
The two centrist parties have resolved not to engage with the far right.
Another factor is the shift in US commitment to European defense, which Less characterized as a “game-changer,” particularly as the US could withdraw 35,000 troops stationed in Germany.
“I interpret Merz’s statements on independence from the US as a serious indication of his and Germany’s support for a more robust Europe,” Less stated. “The reliability of the American security guarantee has diminished, thus the primary rationale for opposing an alternative to NATO is diminishing.”
Is it feasible? European defense autonomy could become a more likely reality if Germany and France collaborate to incorporate the United Kingdom into a supra-EU European defense coalition.
However, others remain skeptical.
“If Europe enhances its defense capabilities, it would not weaken NATO; instead, it would bolster the alliance, strengthen transatlantic bonds, and improve collaboration,” Grimes argued.
“The real concern isn’t autonomy for its own sake; it’s about enhancing deterrence,” he noted. “Improved European capacities can only serve to reinforce, rather than supplant, the longstanding security framework.”
Increased defense spending “will come at a cost because the more autonomous Europe becomes regarding security, the more independently it may act politically, possibly aligning more closely with China,” he added, “which contradicts US strategic interests.”
