In the lively morning at the Dongmen wet market in the heart of Taipei, Mr. Yu can be heard calling out to pedestrians, attempting to sell his crates of freshly steamed dumplings. Between serving his customers, the self-proclaimed “dumpling king” and his wife, Ms. Liao, engage in a conversation about Donald Trump.
“He’s quite positive and full of energy,” Yu remarks as he exchanges flour-dusted coins with a customer. Liao adds, “The dancing! Isn’t he in his 80s?” Yu nods in agreement, but when it comes to discussing what Trump’s presidency means for Taiwan, the older couple’s enthusiasm wanes.
“Increased tariffs would lead to higher prices, and people can’t handle that,” Yu mentions. “He’s just looking for money,” Liao shrugs in response.
During Trump’s previous term, he was generally well-received in Taiwan as a formidable counter to China’s intimidation regarding annexation.
Within that timeframe, there was a significant increase in US arms sales to Taiwan, US naval activity in the Taiwan Strait escalated, and Trump deviated from tradition by accepting a phone call from Taiwan’s then-president Tsai Ing-wen, thereby affirming her administration’s legitimacy.
However, Trump’s possible return has led to global upheaval, with actions including the closure of USAid, discussions with Russia over Ukraine, and proposals to annex Greenland and Canada while also suggesting control over Gaza for “redevelopment.” His stance towards Taipei has been ambiguous at best, leaving the island in a precarious position. A reduction in American support here would trigger a fundamental crisis.
“The Trump administration has already shown readiness to abruptly deviate from years of bipartisan US policy toward China,” states Bethany Allen, who leads China investigations and analysis at ASPI.
“[It] signifies a shift away from liberal democratic ideals in its foreign policy considerations—raising the potential that US support for Taiwan may become less about its fundamental values as a democracy deserving preservation.”
China has long issued threats to invade and annex Taiwan should it decline to accept “reunification” peacefully with the mainland. A military modernization initiative led by China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is bringing Beijing closer to realizing that goal.
Support from the US, Taiwan’s principal ally, is deemed essential for the island’s survival. Although the US officially refrains from confirming whether it would militarily defend Taiwan against a Chinese offensive, former president Joe Biden consistently indicated that they likely would under his administration. The US provides Taiwan with billions in weaponry under legal obligations for its defense and utilizes its military and foreign policy to maintain the peaceful “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.
Nonetheless, Trump is now questioning the value of US support and has floated the notion of demanding Taiwan pay for its protection. He has accused Taiwan of “stealing” the US semiconductor industry, along with criticizing trading partners—including Taiwan—for having surpluses against the US. He has threatened or enacted significant tariffs.
His approach raises questions about how Trump perceives Taiwan – whether as a longstanding ally, a strategic asset, a business competitor, or merely a bargaining tool with China.
“There are two areas of uncertainty: the first concerns how the president will evaluate Taiwan’s significance to the US in varying scenarios, and the second is whether the rest of the government can influence Trump’s views on supporting Taiwan,” asserts Rorry Daniels, managing director of the Asia Society Policy Institute.
Beijing’s ‘nightmare scenario’
Some hopeful signs have emerged. Earlier this month, following a meeting between Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, both leaders issued a statement that specifically mentioned Taiwan, employing stronger language to underscore that the US and Japan “oppose any unilateral efforts to change the status quo through force or coercion.” This week, the US State Department revised its Taiwan page to remove a line explicitly stating that the US did not back Taiwanese independence. Both actions met with approval in Taipei but received criticism from Beijing.
Nonetheless, analysts explain that these developments stem from Trump’s administration rather than from the president himself, who is known for sudden declarations and executive decisions that can overturn long-standing policies abruptly.
Daniels notes that influential members of the administration hold “broader views” regarding Taiwan, often taking a hawkish stance on China—such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz—but it remains unclear how significant their perspectives are in shaping the president’s views daily.
Trump’s discussions regarding Ukraine have especially unsettled individuals in Taiwan, many of whom perceive similarities between Russia’s actions and China’s objectives. Allen indicates that the Republican party exhibits far less empathy toward China than it does toward Russia. This situation further compounds the apprehensions surrounding Trump’s unpredictability, particularly since he does not appear to prioritize defending democracies against authoritarian regimes. Few analysts believe Taiwan could effectively serve as a bargaining chip. However, there exists the possibility that President Xi Jinping might encourage Trump to endorse “peaceful reunification” and weaken Taiwan’s stance. Biden declined such requests. Trump could either agree or choose to take a different route.
“For Beijing, the worst-case scenario would be if the Trump administration began to support the Lai [Ching-te] government in unprecedented manners, an outcome that could become more likely if US-China relations further deteriorate,” outlines Amanda Hsiao, China director at the Eurasia Group. “It’s not clear they understand Trump’s motivations.”
Behind closed doors, Taiwanese government officials maintain that the relationship with the US remains robust and stable, citing actions like the Trump-Ishida statement and the recent modifications to the State Department website.
However, apprehensions regarding Trump’s seemingly “lukewarm” perspective on Taiwan are increasingly evident, despite the Taiwan government’s outwardly reassuring stance, according to Kwei-bo Huang, a diplomacy professor at Taiwan’s National ChengChi University.
“Taiwan cannot afford to fall into wishful thinking, believing that Trump, who has not personally assured Taiwan of security support since at least his first term ended, will automatically mobilize US troops to aid Taiwan in urgent situations,” Huang cautioned.
Chips are down
Trump’s suggested tariffs on Taiwan’s critical semiconductor exports have sparked widespread dissatisfaction and dominate discussions in local media. The Taiwanese government has dispatched delegations to Washington, committed to purchasing more US gas and weaponry to address trade discrepancies, and pledged to elevate its defense budget beyond 3% of its GDP.
Semiconductors are vital components for everything from smartphones to vehicles and advanced military systems, with many analysts asserting that a significant aspect of Taiwan’s protection strategy hinges on retaining production of its most sophisticated chips—90% of which supply the global market—domestically.
This week, Trump announced that tariffs would commence at 25% across the entire sector (though without specifying Taiwan) and would increase thereafter. The precise application of these tariffs remains unclear.
Additionally, Trump’s team is reportedly pushing chip manufacturing titan TSMC to enter an unspecified partnership with Intel’s facilities. This seems connected to Trump’s belief that Taiwan has “stolen” US chip technology, along with what Mark Williams, the chief Asia economist at Capital Economics, describes as a “gradual shift underway to rebuild chip-making capacity in the US.”
Major Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers, including TSMC, have opted not to provide comments on the matter.
Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the US-based German Marshall Fund, suggests that the US-Taiwan relationship is likely to remain strong. “However, Taiwan will probably face pressure from Trump to comply with his demands.”
At the Dongmen market, Yu encapsulates the dilemma: if Trump continues to support Taiwan with arms and refrains from escalating tariffs, they will manage. But, he emphasizes, that outcome is beyond Taiwan’s control.
“He’s unpredictable,” Yu concludes. “His interest lies in what benefits the US, but the crucial element is that you can never really predict his thought process, can you?”
Additional research by Jason Tzu Kuan Lu
