Trump Is Not Seeking to Satisfy Putin—He Envisions a New US-China-Russia Alliance

There has been significant and warranted focus on the potential ramifications of a possible agreement between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, particularly regarding the overwhelmingly adverse impacts this could have on Ukraine and Europe. However, if Trump and Putin strike a deal, the stakes extend far beyond just Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Europe’s ties with the United States.

As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, uncertainty looms large over Ukraine’s future, more so than it has since February 2022. The analogies to the Munich Agreement of 1938 are strikingly relevant. This is not due to a misguided belief that Putin can be appeased, but rather because powerful nations are once again deciding the fates of less powerful states without their involvement.

Much like Czechoslovakia faced immense pressure from Germany and its supposed allies, France and Britain, in 1938, Ukraine is currently caught between military pressure from Russia and diplomatic and economic pressure from the U.S. Trump and his administration are aggressively urging Ukraine to concede territory to Russia, essentially accepting that around 20% of its lands, currently under illegal Russian occupation, are lost. Moreover, Trump insists that Ukraine repay the U.S. for prior military aid by relinquishing half of its mineral and rare earth resource reserves.

The American hesitation to offer concrete security guarantees for Ukraine, as well as for allied NATO forces should they be deployed in the event of a ceasefire or peace settlement, echoes the Munich analogy quite closely. In 1938, not only did France and Britain pressure Czechoslovakia to relinquish the ethnic German-majority Sudetenland to Nazi Germany, but they also stood by as Poland and Hungary seized parts of the nation. They failed to react when Hitler, merely six months following the Munich Agreement, dismantled what remained of Czechoslovakia by establishing a Slovak satellite state and occupying the rest of Czech territory.

There are strong indications that Putin is unlikely to restrict his ambitions to Ukraine alone. It’s crucial to note that the Second World War began only 11 months after Neville Chamberlain believed he had secured ‘peace in our time.’

However, the Munich analogy might not extend that far. Unlike Chamberlain and Daladier in 1938, Trump is not attempting to placate Putin out of a belief that he possesses weaker negotiating cards. Instead, Trump appears to adopt a more simplistic worldview wherein great powers delineate spheres of influence, abstaining from interference.

ISW map showing the state of the conflict in Ukraine, February 20 2025.
The state of the conflict in Ukraine, February 20 2025.
Institute for the Study of War

The challenge for Ukraine and Europe in such a new world order is that Ukraine is not seen by anyone in Trump’s team as part of an American sphere of influence, with Europe being regarded as at best a minor component of it.

Trump’s Perspective on the Global Stage

For Trump, this situation isn’t fundamentally about Ukraine or Europe; it’s more about restructuring the international system to align with his 19th-century worldview, where the U.S. exists in splendid isolation, virtually unchallenged in the Western Hemisphere. In this perspective, Ukraine embodies the failures of the old global order. Mirroring the isolationist sentiments of Henry Cabot Lodge, Trump’s outlook suggests that the U.S. has been entangled in too many foreign endeavors that do not align with its vital interests.

Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelensky with US special envoy Keith Kellogg in Kyiv, February 20.
Restored hope: Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky with US special envoy Keith Kellogg in Kyiv, February 20.
EPA-EFE/Sergey Dolzhenko

In echoing Putin’s rhetoric, Trump has shifted the narrative around the war against Ukraine, portraying it not as unprovoked aggression, but as a fault of Kyiv. Ukraine has thus become the ultimate embodiment of the failures of the liberal international order.

The conflict in Ukraine symbolizes this failure yet is not its sole cause. Under the direction of Trump and Putin, it has been weaponized to deliver a decisive blow to the existing order. However, while the U.S. and Russia may easily dismiss the current global structure, constructing a new one will prove far more challenging.

The pushback from Ukraine and key European nations may currently seem insignificant, yet even in the absence of U.S. involvement, the EU and NATO are equipped with robust institutional frameworks and substantial resources. Despite the legitimate critique of Europe’s predominantly aspirational responses thus far, the continent is rooted in politically and economically resilient foundations compared to Russia, and the vast majority of its citizens have no desire to replicate the conditions under Putin’s emerging empire.

Moreover, Trump and Putin will find it difficult to exert global influence without China’s participation. Any agreement between them might meet Trump’s goal of creating a rift between Moscow and Beijing, but given Russia’s reliance on China and the rivalry between China and the U.S., that strategy seems dubious.

Should Trump forge a separate deal with Xi, perhaps concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea or Taiwan, the outcome would likely result in the U.S. further retreating into the Western Hemisphere. This would leave Putin and Xi free to strengthen their existing partnership without interference from an American-led counterbalance.

From the viewpoint of what remains of the liberal international order and its advocates, any alliance between Putin and Xi draws a disturbing parallel to the brief Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. However, it appears that the Putin-Xi relationship is unlikely to fracture as swiftly.